I. Introduction
[1] On 11 July 2002, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Ct. H.R.) ruled unanimously in the cases of Goodwin and I v. the United Kingdom (1) that the failure of British law to recognize gender reassignment and to permit male to female transsexuals to marry persons of their newly opposite sex violated the applicants' right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR) and to marry (Article 12). These two cases, apart from constituting an explicit deviation from previous constant jurisprudence, gave the Court (sitting as a Grand Chamber) an opportunity to creatively apply its longstanding interpretative principles, including the search for a 'common European approach' -now increasingly an 'international trend' -, in order to evolve human rights law. The following observations will focus on this aspect, while paying due attention to the other implications of the present cases. Finally, the two cases will be placed in the context of the current jurisprudence of the Court which, unfortunately, does not show a consistent tendency to progressively advance human rights law.
II. The Facts (2)
[2] Both applicants are post-operative male to female transsexuals. Goodwin, born in 1937, was diagnosed as a transsexual in the mid-1960s. She nevertheless married a woman and they had four children, but she divorced her on an unspecified date. Until January 1985, when she began treatment in earnest (including hormone therapy), she dressed as a man for work but as a woman in her free time. Since this time, she has lived fully as a woman. In 1990, she underwent gender re-assignment surgery, paid for by the National Health Service ("NHS").
[3] Goodwin claimed that between 1990 and 1992 she was sexually harassed by colleagues at work. A complaint to the Industrial Tribunal was unsuccessful, allegedly because she was considered in law to be a man. She was subsequently dismissed from her employment and believes that the real reason was that she was a transsexual. [4] In 1996, Goodwin started work with a new employer and was required to provide her National Insurance ("NI") number. She wanted to keep her previous sexual identity confidential and therefore requested the allocation of a new NI number from the Department of Social Security ("DSS"), but this was rejected and she eventually gave the new employer her NI number. Goodwin submitted that the new employer has now traced back her identity and that she had begun experiencing problems at work.
[5] The DSS also informed the applicant that she would be ineligible for retirement benefits at the age of 60, the age of entitlement for women in the United Kingdom, and that her pension contributions would have to be continued until the date at which she reached the age of 65, being the entitlement threshold for men. In April 1997, she therefore entered into an undertaking with the DSS to directly pay the NI contributions and the DSS issued her with a 'Form CF 384 Age Exemption Certificate' (a document otherwise used to inform employers that a female employee has reached, or is about to reach, the age of 60 and is entitled not to have the NI deductions made).
[6] Goodwin also complained of certain difficulties when dealing with the DSS, such as the marking of her files as 'sensitive' and resulting complications. She added that in a number of instances she has had to choose between revealing her birth certificate and foregoing certain advantages (loans, re-mortgage offers, etc., as well as lower car insurance premiums applicable to women). Nor did she feel able to report a theft to the police, for fear that the investigation would require her to reveal her identity. [7] "I", born in 1955, worked for some time as a dental nurse in the army before retiring for health reasons at the age of 33. In 1985, she had applied for a course for the Enrolled Nurse (General) qualification, but was not admitted as she refused to present her birth certificate. In 1993 and 1994, the applicant wrote letters to various institutions requesting amendments to the relevant legislation to allow the recognition of transsexuals' changed gender. Twice in 2001, when she applied for a student loan and for a job as administrative assistant in a prison, "I" was requested to submit or bring to the interview her birth certificate.
[8] Both applicants alleged breaches of their rights to private life (Article 8 ECHR), to marry (Article 12) and not to be discriminated against (Article 14). Goodwin also claimed a breach of her right to an effective remedy (Article 13). (3) III. The Court's Judgment A. The Right to Private Life (Article 8 ECHR) [9] The decisive issue for the Court was in each case "whether or not the respondent State has failed to comply with a positive obligation to ensure the right of the applicant … to respect for her private life, in particular through the lack of legal recognition given to her gender re-assignment." (4) Emphasizing the fair balance between individual and public interests that needed to be struck when determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, (5) the Court recalled the various previous British cases (6) where it had found that the laws and practices regulating the status of transsexuals were in conformity with Article 8 ECHR. (7) [10] While noting that it would not depart "without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases" (8) , the Court underscored that it must have regard to the "changing conditions within the respondent State and within Contracting States generally and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved" (9) and added:
A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement. ... In the present context the Court has, on several occasions since 1986, signalled its consciousness of the serious problems facing transsexuals and stressed the importance of keeping the need for appropriate legal measures in this area under review. …(10)
[11] Following its balancing-approach, the Court first (Step 1) took a look at the applicants' individual situations before ( Step 2) examining "[a]gainst these considerations, … the countervailing arguments of a public interest nature put forward as justifying the continuation of the present situation." (11) [12] Step 1: Amongst the factors adversely affecting the applicants and other noteworthy facts, the Court enumerated the following:
• The continuation of the applicants' legal status as 'males' despite the fact that they live as 'females'. Being registered as men they must pay contributions to the public retirements schemes until the age of 65 while they are employed as women. In order to stop employers' contributions and to make payments themselves they must follow a "special procedure that might in itself call attention to [their] status." (12) • The law's refusal to recognize the applicants' new sex was more that a "minor inconvenience" but " [a] conflict between social reality and law … which places the transsexual in an anomalous position, in which he or she may experience feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety." (13) • The fact that gender-reassignment surgery was authorized and paid for by the NHS. (14) The failure to recognize "the legal implications of the result to which the treatment leads" was found to be "illogical" and the practices thus lacking "coherence." (15) • The recognition of the "unsatisfactory nature of the current position and plight of transsexuals" by British courts and a governmental agency entrusted with identifying measures to reform the law (the "Interdepartmental Working Group"). (18) [13] Step 2: Of the 'public interest' factors relevant for its balancing test, the Court identified (a) medical and scientific considerations, (b) the question whether there was any "European and international consensus", and (c) the possible impact of any changes to the current birth register system. (19) [14] (a) The Court still could not identify any "conclusive findings as to the cause of transsexualism and, in particular, whether it is wholly psychological or associated with physical differentiation in the brain". It acknowledged, however, that transsexualismhad been widely recognized on the international plane "as a medical condition for which treatment is provided in order to afford relief." The Court then subsumed two factors under 'medical and scientific considerations' that led it to conclude that the causes of transsexualism were of less relevance: Firstly, that the British health service, in line with the vast majority of comparable European institutions, not only "acknowledges the existence of the condition" but permits and funds treatment, "including irreversible surgery." Secondly, it could not be "suggested that there is anything arbitrary or capricious in the decision taken by a person to undergo gender reassignment", given the painful treatment and the "level of commitment and conviction required to achieve a change in social gender role." (20) [15] The Court added that "the principal unchanging biological aspect of gender identity is the chromosomal element" which must not "inevitably take on decisive significance for the purposes of legal attribution of gender identity for transsexuals." (21) The medical considerations were thus found not to provide a definite answer as to how the law should treat transsexuals.
[16] (b) The Court noted that while at the time of the Rees judgment (of 1986) there had been little common ground amongst European states with respect to sex changes, when Sheffield and Horsham was decided (of 1998) "there was an emerging consensus within Contracting States in the Council of Europe on providing legal recognition following gender re-assignment", (22) but still a "lack of a common European approach as to how to address the repercussions which the legal recognition of a change of sex may entail for other areas of law …" (23) , among them marriage. While according to the British NGO 'Liberty', which had already been admitted as amicus curiae in Sheffield and Horsham and had submitted an updated survey in the present proceedings, that had not changed in Europe in the past four years, (24) the attitude elsewhere -Australia and New Zealand are being mentioned (25) -had indeed, in particular in the context of marriage. (26) Thus, the Court ruled that despite the fact that little common ground could be made out in Europe with respect to handling the practical problems, "the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals" (27) was more decisive.
[17] (c) Finally, the Court did not follow the government's arguments (which had been sustained in the Rees judgment) that allowing exceptions to the rules governing the birth record system in favor of transsexuals would undermine its function or would have detrimental effects on the rights of others. Given the statistical figures (2,000-5,000 persons in the United Kingdom) and the fact that a reform process had already been initiated domestically, it was "not convinced … that the need to uphold rigidly the integrity of the historic basis of the birth registration system takes on the same importance in the current climate as it did in 1986." (28) [18] On the basis of these assessments, the Court turned to striking a balance in the cases before it: Irrespective of the absence of particularly severe interferences in the applicants' cases, Article 8 guaranteed "personal autonomy" which included the right to "establish details of [one's] identity." (29) "In the Twenty-first Century the right of transsexuals to personal development and to physical and moral security in the full sense enjoyed by others in society cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the lapse of time to cast clearer light on the issues involved. In short, the unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals live in an intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the other is no longer sustainable." (30) While acknowledging that this finding might cause certain difficulties associated with changing the system of birth registration and modifications to the legal regulations in other fields, the Court could rely on the opinions of British agencies that these problems were far from insuperable. The Court found no reasons to assume that the required changes would have significant detrimental effects on third parties, and expressed its conviction "that society may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them at great personal cost." (31) [19] Finally, the Court criticized the absence of any purposeful reform measures in Britain despite its warning, most recently in Sheffield and Horsham, that there was a need to keep this area under constant review. The only domestic legislative change had occurred in the field of employment law in order to comply with a 1996 judgment of the European Court of Justice. (32) The fair balance, for all these reasons, "now tilts decisively in favour of the applicant [s] ." (33) Their right to respect for private life had thus been violated.
B. The Right to Marry and Found a Family (Article 12 ECHR)
[20] "Reviewing the situation in 2002", as the Court emphasized, it departed from its previous holdings limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex and linking 'marriage' and 'founding a family'. It now accepted that the second aspect was "not … a condition of the first and the inability of any couple to conceive or parent a child cannot be regarded as per se removing their right to enjoy the first limb of this provision." (34) The Court acknowledged that marriage as an institution had undergone major social changes in the past 50 years. The developments in the treatment methods of transsexuals now permitted them to be "assimilate[d] … as closely as possible to the gender in which they perceive that they properly belong and the assumption by the transsexual of the social role of the assigned gender." (35) [21] Male-to-female transsexuals, such as the applicants, could still marry a person of their former opposite sex; that, however, was considered to be an "artificial" argument by the Court (the respondent state had suggested that no absolute ban on marriage existed), since they now lived as women and wished to marry men, which was legally impermissible. That, the Court found, infringed upon "the very essence" (36) of the right to marry; no intent could be made out to change that situation on the domestic plane. (37) [22] Turning to the question of European or international standard-setting trends, the Court acknowledged that "fewer countries permit the marriage of transsexuals in their assigned gender than recognise the change of gender itself." But it did not accept that it should therefore leave the matter entirely within the states' margin of appreciation, since that margin cannot extend to an outright prohibition of marriages involving transsexuals. "While it is for the Contracting State to determine inter alia the conditions under which a person claiming legal recognition as a transsexual establishes that gender re-assignment has been properly effected or under which past marriages cease to be valid and the formalities applicable to future marriages … the Court finds no justification for barring the transsexual from enjoying the right to marry under any circumstances." (38) Therefore, the Court held that Article 12 ECHR was also violated. (39)
C. Damages and Costs
[23] The Court did not award Goodwin any compensation for pecuniary damages, finding that she had continued (albeit not quite voluntarily) to work after reaching the retirement age for women and had thus earned an income. "I" had retired even before lodging the application. As for non-pecuniary damages, the Court found that while both applicants had suffered anxiety and distress in the past, the essence of their complaint was legal recognition of their status as transsexuals and held that the "finding of [a] violation, with the consequences which will ensue for the future, may in these circumstances be regarded as constituting just satisfaction." The Court did, however, make awards for costs and expenses of € 39,000.00 and 23,000.00 respectively. (41)
IV. Assessment
[24] The following assessment will briefly touch upon the Court's previous practice concerning the legal recognition of transsexuals before turning to an analysis of the judgments in Goodwin and I in light of the prevailing canons of interpretation of the ECHR and the general trends in recent practice of the Court when it is called upon to recognize a change in social realities or another development that would mandate a reconsideration or, even, a change of its jurisprudence.
A. The Court's Practice Concerning Transsexuals
[25] As the Court recalls in Goodwin and I, it has previously rejected essentially similar complaints against the United Kingdom in an almost routinely fashion. In all these cases, the detrimental effects of the British authorities' traditional approach to registering births and maintaining that register had -so far -not been considered serious enough to override the state's margin of appreciation in this respect. Demands to alter the register system, to permit (confidential) annotations to the existing register or to issue new birth certificates reflecting the changed sex of the applicants had failed. The Court found that the measures taken, such as issuing identity documents with the new names and sex, while not giving full legal recognition to the sex change, were nevertheless sufficient, because they helped avoid intrusive inquiries into the private sphere of the persons concerned at least to a certain degree. In X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom (of 1997) (42) it held that disallowing a transsexual's request to be registered as the father of a child did not violate Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. Only in B v. France (of 1992) (43), where a maleto-female transsexual was prevented even from changing her first name to a female, did the (plenary) Court conclude by a majority that a violation of her right to private life had taken place. It noted the significant differences between the British and French systems with respect to civil status, the change of first names, and identity documents (44) , which placed a much heavier burden on transsexuals, for instance by allowing them name-changes only insofar as one of the few gender-neutral first names was chosen, (45) and found that the required fair balance between individual and public interests had not been attained. (46) [26] Ever since Rees, however, the Court has underscored that while "… it must for the time being be left to the respondent State to determine to what extent it can meet the remaining demands of transsexuals", the "need for appropriate legal measures should … be kept under review having regard particularly to scientific and societal developments." (47) In Sheffield and Horsham, it said that it "needs to be kept under review", (48) rather than 'should'.
[27] The claims of Goodwin and I are identical to the earlier British complaints in their entirety. Thus, the Court's deviation from its practice is not grounded in the particular circumstances of the applicants that would distinguish them from previous ones, but in a (sudden, but not entirely unexpected) change of standards. Because of that change, the Court was in a position to redefine the state's margin and to hold that the British approach, which had still been sustained in 1998, was no longer viable in 2002. The United Kingdom still enjoys a residual margin when selecting the "appropriate means of achieving recognition of the right", (49) i.e. full legal recognition of transsexuals. When addressing the question how the standards changed, regard must be had to the general canons of interpretation the Court has developed.
B. The Principles of Interpretation of the Convention
[28] Goodwin and I progressively advance the substantive rights of the Convention. The judgments follow a longstanding tradition of the Court: It has placed at its own disposal a flexible set of tools for interpretation, and it uses them creatively. Prominently among them features the dynamic approach, which is also relied on in Goodwin and I: The interpretation must be "dynamic" and "evolutive", taking into account that the ECHR is "a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions." (50) Authors have pointed out and it appears settled today (51) that the Convention has "law-making character" and should be seen as "a bill of rights that must be interpreted so as to permit its development with time" (52) and with changing "social and political attitudes." (53) The Court has, in this respect, become somewhat dynamic, although not as dynamic as society itself. (54) The Convention is, moreover, "intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective." (55) [29] The Court has also routinely looked at common European standards: A comparative survey of both the laws and practices of member states illustrating that there is a widely accepted standard with respect to the treatment of a certain issue or procedure may be the basis for, again, a dynamic interpretation, while no or little common ground between the states parties allows a respondent state to exercise its discretion within a rather wide margin of appreciation. (56) When identifying a European standard, the Court has also frequently referred to other European treaties and the level of their acceptance as an indicator for an emerging broad or uniform practice, (57) as well as documents produced by other Council of Europe bodies, such as the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. European Union law has also featured prominently on its list of precious sources, (58) and thus is does not come as a surprise that in Goodwin and I reference is made to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (59) which, in its Article 9 indeed does not refer to men and women as the partners in a marriage, unlike Article 12 of the Convention.
[30] Beddard argues: "To be effective, a treaty guaranteeing human rights must necessarily be dynamic." (60) Frowein and Peukert (61) rightly treat the various principles of interpretation as interacting in practice; the formulas 'practical and effective' and 'living instrument' comprise not merely the effective, but also the dynamic and favorable elements inherent in the Strasbourg Court's legal analysis and appear to govern the practice in the first place. Probably beginning with Golder (of 1975) (62) , the Court has been applying a modern 'object and purpose'-oriented method of interpretation utilizing the most feasible of the above principles. (63) Occasionally it has been argued, of course, that such an interpretative flexibility has led to reasoning that is "unsatisfactory, little more than rationalizations of preferred outcomes." (64) That was clearly not the case in Goodwin and I. It appears that the Court's jurisprudence concerning the legal status of transsexuals was progressing at a rather slow pace, instead, and was lagging behind the developments in the domestic laws of the vast majority of European states, which were apparently influenced by a Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of 1989. (65) In particular the United Kingdom was given not only a wide margin of appreciation, but also a lot of time to remedy the situation domestically, while the Court would likely have preferred a different solution at an earlier point in time.
C. Goodwin and I in Light of the Recent Practice of the Court
[31] The judgments in Goodwin and I use the flexible approach to arrive at the finding that Articles 8 and 12 ECHR were violated. The need for a dynamic, evolutive interpretation of Convention rights is emphasized. The cases stand out, however, by comparison to other recent practice: The Court here did not miss the opportunity to advance the interpretation of European human rights law by extracting new or modified standards from feasible sources. In other cases, it did. In Ferrazzini (of 2001) (66) , for instance, the Grand Chamber did not consider that there had been sufficient changes in how taxes were perceived -i.e. as typical 'civic obligations' dealt with in a 'public law'-relationship between taxpayers and the authorities -permitting it to qualify tax assessment proceedings as civil within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1. Six judges dissented, suggesting that there are "no convincing arguments for maintaining" (67) the restrictive case-law, even though they stopped short of agreeing with commentators (68) who had put "the question whether it is at all possible to draw any clear and convincing dividing line between 'civil' and 'non-civil' rights and obligations based on the Court's present case-law, and, if not, whether the time has come to end that uncertainty by extending the protection under [Article 6 para. 1] to all cases in which a determination by a public authority of the legal position of a private party is at stake." (69) In Al-Adsani (of 2001) (70) the Court, by nine votes to eight, "while noting the growing recognition of the overriding importance of the prohibition of torture, does not … find it established that there is yet acceptance in international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged torture committed outside the forum State" (71) and thereby missed a unique opportunity to advance the level of acceptance itself, rather than seeking it elsewhere. (72) [32] In other cases, the Court sought to advance, or rather, consolidate, its jurisprudence, but failed: In Pellegrin (of 1999) (73) , to quote one of the more controversial examples that has also been subject to a scholarly discussion, the Court recognized that its existing case-law on the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 to proceedings involving civil or public servants "contains a margin of uncertainty for Contracting States as to the scope of their obligations … in disputes raised by employees in the public sector over their conditions of service." It added that its practice did indeed "leave scope for a degree of arbitrariness." (74) When, however, it introduced the "functional criterion",-which focuses on whether a particular employee in the public sector "wields a portion of the State's sovereign power" (75) -the Court, in neglecting the very outspoken dissent of four judges (76) , managed to introduce a concept that is, in part, even more restrictive and generally quite confusing: (77) Purely economic cases involving 'power-wielding' civil servants, for instance, were considered 'civil' before, but are no longer under the Pellegrin standard.
[33] The Court in Goodwinand I could not, or no longer, base its change in jurisprudence on a growing European consensus on how the law should treat transsexuals, since that had already emerged in the aftermath of the 1989 Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation and, as the evidence adduced in the course of the deliberations showed, there was no further development in Europe between the years 1998 (Sheffield and Horsham) and 2002. (78) Instead, it relied heavily on an "international trend", finding support for its liberal interpretation of Article 8 para. 1 ECHR in cases stemming, inter alia, from New Zealand and Australia. With that, the Court displayed an attitude that should wholeheartedly be embraced, since it re-introduces -without, however, opening Pandora's box -the borrowing of concepts that permit an evolutive interpretation of the Convention in favor of the individual from nonEuropean legal systems and, in the first place, from other regional and the universal systems of human rights protection. (79) While the European Court of Human Rights has a well-advanced case-law in many areas and has long served as a source of guidance and inspiration for other human rights systems, in particular the Inter-American one (80) , one should not assume that Europe holds the lead in every respect. The issue of protecting the rights of members of minority groups and indigenous peoples is a telling example: (81) The European bodies, for many decades, have been satisfied when governments did not show "disregard" for minorities, before the Court in Chapman (of 2001) established a "special consideration" (83) standard requiring a somewhat higher degree of attention that has to be paid to the particular needs of persons belonging to such groups. This practice, if read with due regard to the differences in history, political realities, and legal approaches between Europe and the Americas, could nevertheless serve, at the very least, as a precious source of inspiration for the human rights bodies of the old continent.
[34] Goodwin and I must in any event be welcomed as decisions which finally remedy a situation that has likely been left within the margin of appreciation of certain states for too long. Beyond that, they give new life to interpretative tools that have helped shape the Convention in the past. One should hope that the Court will rely on them more consistently. (1) Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. 28957/95, Christine Goodwin v (24) The Court phrases this as follows: "While this would appear to remain the case …"; ibid.
(25) 'Liberty' "while there had not been a statistical increase in States giving full legal recognition of gender reassignment within Europe, information from outside Europe showed developments in this direction. For example, there had been statutory recognition of gender re-assignment in Singapore, and a similar pattern of recognition in
